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Introduction 
 
Developing country advocates have long noted the irony of including the world “development” in 
the official title of a round of multilateral trade negotiations they perceive as being about anything 
but development. In this paper, however, we will suggest that the round’s title - the “Doha Devel-
opment Agenda” - is as ironic for its third word as for its second, because agenda-setting controver-
sies have been at least as influential in leading to the round’s collapse as disagreements over its de-
velopment content.  
 
Many of the bitterest disagreements in the seven years of negotiations leading up to Doha’s (appar-
ently final) collapse centered precisely on what should be included in the agenda. For three years 
after the launch of the round, European negotiators insisted that a Development Agenda should in-
clude talks on issues like competition policy, investment and transparency in public procurement 
(the so called “Singapore Issues”): matters that most developing countries did not wish to open to 
negotiations. Once the most controversial of those issues were excluded from the agenda, bargain-
ing towards a final agreement became impossible, and the round found itself mired in an impasse 
that could never be resolved. In this paper, we explore the dynamic interplay between the agenda 
disputes leading up to the 2004 agenda settlement (the July Package) and the deadlocked bargaining 
interaction that followed it, exploring how the European Commission’s failure to secure its pre-
ferred agenda for the round pre-configure a European negotiating stance that led to open-ended 
deadlock and to a shift in its negotiating priorities away from multilateralism and towards bilateral, 
regional and inter-regional agreements. 
 
In a recent survey of the literature on EU trade policy making, Dur and Zimmermann (2007: 783) 
note that “virtually no research has been carried out that tries to apply the vast literature on negotia-
tion theory to EU negotiations.” In what follows, we begin to fill this gap by introducing some basic 
concepts from negations theory into our explanation of the EU’s behavior in the Doha Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  
 
First, we introduce the basic distinction between an “agenda setting” and a “bargaining” stage of 
negotiations, noting the importance of the former in settling what Zartman (1977, 1978) calls the 
“fair terms of exchange” that will underlie an eventual agreement. We argue that agenda setting 
pre-configure negotiators’ “win sets”, understood as the range of possible agreements that they see 
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as both viable and desirable. We then explore the ways in which the eventual agenda settlement to 
the Doha Round has closed the European Commission’s Doha win-set and led it to shift negotiating 
resources to other venues, rather than to accept an agreement that would impose high costs on influ-
ential European pressure groups.  
 
These simple tools from negotiations theory allow us to extend De Bièvre and Dür’s 2005 model of 
trade policy (De Bièvre and Dür 2005, Dür 2007, Dür 2008) making to the relatively neglected di-
mension of agenda setting and venue selection. We follow De Bièvre and Dür’s behavioral model 
ofpolicy makers as office seekers, devoid of ideological concerns. We cast their agenda preferences 
as strategic responses to complex patterns of sectoral interest group preferences expressed through 
lobbying. The Commission’s role, in this interpretation, is not to reach a common understanding 
with its negotiating partners at the multilateral table, or even to further some abstract, exogenously 
given conception of the "European interest"; it is to negotiate strategically to optimize its respon-
siveness to its own sectoral lobbies.  
 
Office seeking commission officials will be concerned chiefly with preventing sectoral interests 
from mobilizing against them, and secondarily with conveying concentrated benefits on them. They 
will ignore the interests of consumers (because consumers are unable to overcome the collective 
action problem and therefore do not mobilize politically in ways that challenge their ability to retain 
office), and work instead to (1) minimize the adjustment costs accruing to those European sectoral 
groups that would bear a disproportionate portion of the losses that arise from a multilateral agree-
ment, and to (2) maximize the gains to those sectors that stand to capture concentrated gains from 
an agreement.  
 
We show that negotiators maintain these twin goals even when they lead them to adopt inconsistent 
negotiating stances, and even when they threaten to scuttle chances for agreement at the multilateral 
level. Contrary to standard accounts of the political economy of trade, negotiators need not respond 
to the underlying incompatibility between import competitors’ interests and exporters’ interests by 
siding with the former and against the latter at the multilateral table. Instead, they sometimes prefer 
to shift negotiating resources from the multilateral level to venues that appear less hostile to their 
inconsistent preferences. 
 
In short, this paper seeks to extend De Bièvre and Dür’s model of European Trade Policy-Making 
by introducing the agenda setting and venue shifting dimension to their framework, noting the way 
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the commission has acted strategically to set an agenda for the Doha Round that would expand its 
win set, and has responded to an eventual, unfavorable agenda settlement by shifting negotiating 
resources to bilateral, regional and inter-regional negotiations. The first part sets out our extension 
of De Bièvre and Dür’s model, the second part applies it empirically to the case of European deci-
sion making in the Doha Round Negotiations. 
 
Part I. Theory 
1.1 The rising importance of agenda setting 
By now, it is practically a cliché to note that agenda setting controversies have become increasingly 
prominent in multilateral trade negotiations. And yet, as we will see, the most influential models of 
the political economy of trade policy making in negotiated settings obviate the agenda setting prob-
lem altogether, assuming that today’s trade negotiators bargain over much the same sorts of issues 
that dominated their agendas half a century ago. 
  
In his classic formulation, Zartman (1977, 1978) describes negotiations as proceeding sequentially 
through three stages: a pre-negotiation stage, where the parties feel each other out to explore 
whether they may have something to gain from negotiation, a formula-setting stage, where the basic 
shape of the forecoming bargain is determined, and a bargaining stage, or end-game. In multilateral 
negotiations, agenda-setting can be assimilated to this formula-setting stage, where negotiators 
agree what Zartman calls the fair “terms of exchange”: a common understanding of what is legiti-
mately to be traded off against what.  
 
In simple negotiating situations marked by a strong, tacit understanding about what is to be traded 
off against what, agenda setting need not be controversial. The formula that implicitly underpins the 
agreement to be reached between a used car salesman and his customer is not a subject of contro-
versy: both parties understand it to be “car in return for money”, and are therefore able to move di-
rectly into the bargaining stage.  
 
In more complex negotiations, tacit understanding about the basic shape of the underlying bargain 
to be struck cannot be taken for granted. In the absence of a pre-existing agreement about what is to 
be traded off against what, negotiators find it impossible to move into a bargaining interaction. In-
stead, they must pursue a formula-setting exercise where they come to a common understanding of 
the fair terms of exchange for the given negotiation situation. 
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In its early decades, agenda setting disputes were muted in the multilateral trade regime. Negotia-
tors advanced on the basis of widely shared, taken-for-granted understanding of the legitimate for-
mula for negotiations. The first six rounds of multilateral negotiations under the GATT (1947-
1967), centered on the kinds of policy instruments economists have traditionally understood as con-
stituting trade policy: import tariffs and quotas. The title of the original 1947 agreement itself - the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - attests to the fact that, in the immediate post-war period, 
the “grand bargain” underlaying multilateral trade negotiations struck practitioners as self-evident: 
market access for market access. Since “everyone already knew” what was to be traded off against 
what, agenda-setting controversies were limited to technical discussions over the bargaining meth-
odology for reciprocal, MFN tariff abatement – with proponents of a formula-based approach 
squaring off against proponents of tariff line by tariff line negotiations during the formula-setting 
stage to the Kennedy Round.  
 
By the 1980s, however, successive rounds of tariff abatement under the GATT led to demands to broaden 
the multilateral agenda beyond its traditional focus. The GATT-regime came to suffer from a case of “di-
minishing returns to tariff abatement”: as border barriers fell, they played an ever lesser role in impeding 
cross-border manufacturing trade. After seven rounds of liberalization, average tariff rates for manufac-
tured goods had already been brought down considerably, from 40% at the launch of the multilateral sys-
tem to a mere 4.7% after implementation of the Tokyo Round agreements (WTO 2005). Gradually, tariffs 
lost their traditional role as the primary negotiable impediment to cross-border commerce. In their place, a 
host of policies that had not traditionally been considered "trade policies" at all (e.g. local content require-
ments, subsidies, etc.) loomed ever larger as effective barriers to trade, whether or not they had been con-
sciously conceived as “trade policies”.  
 
The trend magnified the importance of agenda-setting in the conduct of multilateral trade rounds. 
Once “non-tariff barriers” (NTBs) were mainstreamed into the conduct of multilateral negotiations, 
essentially any area of economic policy making could be, in a sufficiently creative trade diplomat’s 
hands, construed as somehow “trade related”. Because there is no self-evident answer to the under-
lying question of what does and what does not belong under the aegis of the WTO (Howse 2001), 
once the multilateral trade negotiating agenda is expanded to include NTBs defining the precise 
borders of the system, the specific policy areas to be disciplined, becomes an issue with nearly in-
exhaustible potential to generate dissent. Policy makers could no longer move directly into a bar-
gaining interaction: first, they needed to agree about what they were to bargain over. 
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1.2 Two Level Games and Negotiation Win-Sets 
Traditional analyses of negotiating dynamics in the multilateral trade system have tended to miss 
the dynamic interplay between the formula-setting stage and the bargaining stage, losing sight of 
the fact that, office seeking negotiators face incentives to work strategically towards an agenda set-
tlement that maximizes their chances of obtaining a favorable final settlement. To borrow Putnam’s 
1988 analogy of two-level games, they seek an agenda that optimizes their win-sets: the set of 
agreements they perceive as both viable at the multilateral level and desirable at the domestic level. 
Viability, in this context, is determined by a proposal’s attractiveness to one’s negotiating partners 
(Putnam’s international level game) while desirability is determined by the predicted distribution of 
costs and benefits of an agreement to mobilized domestic constituents (Putnam’s domestic level 
game). The range of agreements that are both viable and desirable constitute the negotiator’s win 
set: 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualizing the Win Set.  
 
Clearly, for a potential settlement to be included in the negotiator’s set of desirable agreements, it 
must be preferable to the situation that would result in the absence of any agreement. Negotiations 
analysts have long stressed the importance of negotiator’s “fall-back positions”: their “best alterna-
tives to a negotiating agreement” (BATNA). From the point of view of any given negotiating venue, 
however, the BATNA need not be “no agreement at all,” and may instead be “agreement, but not in 
this venue.” For a participant engaged in a multilateral trade negotiation, we argue, the best alterna-
tive to a multilaterally negotiated agreement may well be a set of bilaterally, regionally and inter-
regionally negotiatiated agreements.  
 
As we will see, this is precisely the situation the European commission has found itself in since fail-
ing to secure its preferred agenda for the Doha Round negotiations. The agenda settlement eventu-
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ally reached in August 2004 restricted both its set of viable and its set of desirable agreement, in-
creasing the relative attractiveness of bilateral, regional and interregional agreements and leaving 
the commission without a viable win set at the multilateral level. This failure in agenda setting 
forced the commission to toughen its negotiating stance on the remaining agenda items and contrib-
uted to the intractable three way deadlock in negotiations summarized as the Doha triangle.  
 
1.3. The orthodox account of the political economy of trade negotiations 
Orthodox economists’ treatments of the political economy of trade policy negotiations remain hap-
pily oblivious to the increasing prominence of agenda setting controversies at the WTO. The most 
influential academic model to explain reciprocity-based trade negotiations developed by Bagwell 
and Staiger (2002), “assumes away” agenda controversies altogether, treating trade negotiations as 
synonymous with the kind of reciprocal market access quid pro quo that dominated the early dec-
ades (and only the early decades) of the trade regime’s history.  
 
Indeed, the very existence of international trade negotiations presents a puzzle to neoclassical eco-
nomics. A discipline that takes Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage as one of its foundation 
stones has first to explain why policy makers should have to be offered concessions in order to un-
dertake liberalizing commitments that would be in their national interest even if undertaken unilat-
erally. The practice of describing commitments to lower one’s own trade barriers as “concessions” , 
though widespread in the context of trade negotiations, strikes academic economists as fundamen-
tally absurd; the equivalent of demanding a bribe to take one’s hand off of a hot furnace. Expressing 
the consensus view within his discipline, Paul Krugman notes that, 
There is no generally accepted label for the theoretical underpinnings of the GATT. I like to refer to it as 
‘GATT-think’ — a simple set of principles that is entirely consistent, explains most of what goes on in 
negotiations, but makes no sense in terms of economics...The reason why GATT-think works is, instead, 
that it captures some basic realities of the political process.”  (Krugman, 1997) 
 
In their highly influential paper, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) sought to incorporate the “basic politi-
cal realities” GATT-think captures into standard trade theory. Their account leans heavily on the 
one defensible use of tariffs in the neoclassical theoretical canon: the optimal tariff. Briefly stated, 
neoclassical theory demonstrates that border barriers can increase national welfare by manipulating 
the terms of trade to the home country’s benefit (and to the foreign nation’s detriment.)  
 
Bagwell and Staiger’s reasoning is straightforward: when countries set out their tariffs independ-
ently, each will seek to manipulate the terms of trade by imposing an optimal tariff. But if all coun-
tries seek to manipulate their terms of trade simultaneously, the exercise becomes self-defeating: 
Francisco P. Toro       Working Paper  - Agenda Disputes and Strategic Venue Preferences 11 
 
the terms of trade remain constant, while the volume of trade diminishes, and with it economic wel-
fare. Citing the logic of collective action, Bagwell and Staiger interpret this dynamic as a straight-
forward instance of coordination failure. Enforceable multilateral agreements based on the princi-
ples of reciprocity and non-discrimination are, in this view, nothing more than a mechanism for re-
solving such a coordination failure.  
The purpose of a trade agreement is then to eliminate the terms-of-trade-driven restrictions in trade vol-
ume that arise when policies are set unilaterally, and thereby offer governments a means of escape from a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. (Bagwell and Staiger, p. 2) 
 
From this point of view, the “grand bargain” underlying multilateral negotiations can only be a re-
ciprocal tradeoff of market access concessions. In this account, the reciprocity rule is the key to ex-
plaining why trade negotiations are welfare-improving.  
 
While accepting this broad description, a number of authors (Gilligan 1997, Davis 2004, Sherman 
2005, Baldwin 2006) have sought to flesh out the specific political economy mechanisms underly-
ing Bagwell and Staiger’s account, by identifying how sectoral interest’s lobbying activities create 
political pressure to resolve the terms of trade prisoner’s dilemma through reciprocal liberalization. 
Their accounts explicitly draw the link between the positions adopted by trade policy-makers and 
the pressures they face within what Sherman (2002) describes as the “political market for protec-
tion.”  
 
Their starting point is a well-understood observation, stemming from standard trade theory. Protec-
tive tariffs create both winners and losers. While their overall welfare costs typically outweigh their 
benefits, those costs are diffused among a large number of losers (consumers), while benefits are 
concentrated on a small number of winners (import competing producers). The monetary sums any 
individual consumer stands to lose are therefore typically small, while the sums a given import 
competitor stands to win can be very substantial. Though, notionally, consumers would collectively 
benefit from removing tariffs, in practice they fail organize to press their case because they face an 
insurmountable collective action problem (Olson 1965): very few of them are even aware of their 
losses. Import competitors, on the other hand, find it relatively easy to mobilize politically to de-
mand protection: they are few, and the prospective gains for each of them are large. Rational trade 
policy makers will therefore feel safe in ignoring consumers, but will make sure to satisfy the de-
mands of import competitors. Thus, when trade policies are set unilaterally, countries tend towards 
protectionism.  
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Gilligan (1997) stresses that this dynamic takes hold because, when trade policies are set unilater-
ally, exporters are passive: they have no particular reason to organize politically in favor of one 
trade policy stance or another. By contrast, when trade policy is coordinated with trading partners, 
the political economy dynamics of trade policy making change. If negotiations are conducted under 
the rule of reciprocity, exporters find that their access to foreign markets now depends on the level 
of protection in the home market. In this situation, the home country's export sector becomes, for 
the first time, a potential beneficiary of concentrated gains. It is only then that exporters “appear on 
the radar screen” of trade policy makers, since the potential for concentrated gains enables them to 
overcome their collective action problem. 
 
In other words, when trade policies are negotiated reciprocally, exporters’ incentives become the 
mirror image of import-competitors’. The benefits of improved access to foreign markets are con-
centrated on them, the sums to be captured are substantial, and the constituency that stands to bene-
fit is much smaller and more cohesive than the constituency that will bear the costs (in terms of in-
creased domestic prices for the export sector’s goods) of improved access to foreign markets.  In 
this way, multilateral negotiations are said to create a sectoral interest in favor of home market lib-
eralization where none existed before.  
 
As Baldwin puts it,  
Reciprocity is the key. It converts each nation’s exporters from bystanders in the tariff debate to oppo-
nents  of protection within their own nation. Exporters can win the prize of better access to foreign mar-
kets only if tariffs in their home nation are lowered, so lobbying against domestic tariffs becomes a way 
of lowering foreign tariffs. (Baldwin 2006, p. 8) 
 
In a similar vein, Sherman (2005) argues that "GATT, by institutionalizing trade negotiations, has 
transformed trade politics from a political market for protection into a political contest between ex-
porters and import-competitors," and goes on to argue that the structure of international trade nego-
tiations shows pro liberalization bias. 
 
Sherman’s image of trade policy making as “contest” is telling. The implied metaphor here is a tug-
of-war, with import competitors pulling the nation’s tariff profile in one direction while exporters 
tug the rope in the liberalizing direction. The policy stance that results from this sectoral tug-of-war 
can be inferred simply by “adding the lobbying vectors”: when import competitors lobby “harder” 
than exporters, trade policy become relatively more protectionist, when exporters out lobby import 
competitors, trade policy turns more liberal. The key fact about reciprocally negotiated trade 
agreements, in this telling, is that it strengthens the pro-liberalization vector, tending to result in 
more liberal tariff preferences in all negotiating partners.  
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Implicit in this metaphor is that the “flag” tied to the middle of the rope moves unambiguously in 
one direction or the other: countries are portrayed as becoming either more liberal or more protec-
tionist. In other words, what we have is a model that assumes that the heterogeneous preferences of 
contesting lobbies will be aggregated and harmonized by trade policy makers, presumably leading 
to coherent (and increasingly liberal) negotiating postures able to underpin multilateral consensus. 
 
At the international level, the formulation of multilateral trade agreements comes to be seen as the 
art of crafting deals that allow offensive interests to out-lobby defensive interests in each of the 
Member countries and thereby move trade policy stances in an homogenously liberalizing direction. 
The bar this sets for the successful conclusion of a trade agreement is not as high as it might appear 
at first: as Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) show, cooperative solutions to the prisoners’ dilemma 
problem of cross-border tariff setting are Pareto optimal. It is possible for offensive interests in all 
Members to secure gains that outweigh those of their defensive counterparts, as the successful con-
clusion of eight rounds of GATT negotiation demonstrates. 
 
1.4 Shortcomings of the Orthodox Account 
Influential though it has been, the view of trade negotiations as contests between exporters and im-
port competitors fails to account for some of the most salient features of the multilateral trade re-
gime today: the salience of agenda controversies, and the inconsistency of negotiator’s positions. In 
fact, on these two issues, the approach pioneered by Bagwell and Staiger merely begs the question, 
assuming a market access centered agenda that hasn’t been seen in decades as well as a level of co-
herence in negotiating stances that is conspicuously absent from real world negotiations. It is those 
phenomena that call out for an explanation. 
 
A second shortcoming is contained in the “tug of war” metaphore that dominates accounts of the 
“contest between lobbies”: the metaphor precludes the possibility that the “flag” can, under some 
circumstances, move in both directions at once. As Dür and de Bièvre (2005) have shown, when 
faced with heterogeneous lobbying pressures, trade policy makers in the European Union have typi-
cally responded by delegating authority to specialized agents charged with catering both to export-
ers and to import competitors at the same time. Modeling trade policy makers as strategizing office 
seekers, they argue that specialized delegation is the strategy most closely aligned with their under-
lying interests: 
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Political actors, whether principals or agents, do not have a specific trade policy preference independent 
of constituency demands. They rather act as office seekers, avoiding the mobilization of political enemies. 
Voters experience only diffuse benefits or suffer diffuse costs from trade policies, and they are not capa-
ble of organizing effectively on the trade issue (Olson, 1965). However, when well-organized groups feel 
threatened by concentrated costs from trade policies, they can polarize voters by supporting an opposition 
candidate and, thus, mobilize voters indirectly. Because legislators face uncertainty about election results, 
they are eager to make sure that no organized group supports the opposition. Those holding office, conse-
quently, engineer trade policies that produce only diffuse costs. (De Bièvre and Dür 2005: 1274.) 
 
Note that this behavioral model of trade policy makers stresses their defensive posture: while they 
will seek both to benefit offensive interests and to avoid creating costs for defensive interests, their 
priority will be to avoid mobilizing constituencies against them by imposing concentrated costs on 
any sector. 
 
Such a behavioral model shows why the image of a tug-of-war pitting exporters against import 
competitors is misleading. It is arbitrary to assume that trade policy makers must respond to hetero-
geneous lobbying pressures by “adding the vectors” to yield a coherent policy stance, one that 
“splits the difference” between the competing lobbies’ preferred outcomes. In practice, De Bièvre 
and Dür show that trade policy makers have more often responded by setting out inconsistent nego-
tiating positions, positions that are both protectionist - in sectors of concern to defensive interests - 
and liberal - in sectors of concern to offensive interests.  
 
Rather than doing so automatically, as Sherman, Gilligan, Davis and Baldwin expect, the European 
commission has shown great resistance to when asked to aggregate and harmonize heterogeneous 
sectoral interests in the context of the Doha Round. As we will see, when faced with the prospect  
of a multilateral agreement that imposes concentrated losses on key mobilized constituencies, the 
Commission has appealed to its “Best Alternative to a Multilaterally Negotiated Agreement”, pre-
ferring to shift venues by placing renewed emphasis on bilateral and interregional negotiations.  
 
Moreover, the orthodox view fails to account for the growing acrimony in agenda setting negotia-
tions. As we have seen, Bagwell and Staiger’s insights are formally applicable only to the extent 
that trade negotiators limit themselves to trading off market access concessions. Such a stance as-
sumes away the evident growth in the multilateral system’s jurisdiction, its expanding reach into 
areas formerly reserved to domestic regulatory policy, as well as the agenda controversies that have 
marked the latest round of multilateral negotiations.  
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Part II. Empirics 
In this second part, we seek to apply the theoretical insights just developed to the history of the mul-
tilateral trade regime with a view to explaining the strategic stance of European negotiators within 
the Doha Round negotiations. 
 
2.1. The lopsided acquis of the GATT regime 
Since at least the Tokyo Round, multilateral negotiators have approached agenda setting strategi-
cally, in the hope of pre-configuring an agreement likely to maximize the concentrated benefits for 
its offensive interests and to minimize concentrated losses for defensive ones. Negotiators under-
stand that a favorable agenda can expand their win sets, by enlarging both the range of desirable 
negotiating outcomes and potentially obviating the politically difficult task of harmonizing hetero-
genous preferences (that is, of having to take sides with their offensive interests and impose concen-
trated costs on their defensive interests) at the end of the round.  
 
For European Commission negotiators, such a strategic approach to agenda setting has been espe-
cially necessary in the Doha Round due to the particular characteristics the trade regime has devel-
oped after successive rounds of liberalization. Had previous rounds liberalized trade homogenously 
across different sectors, a traditional market access for market access quid pro quo may have been 
able to underpin a successful Doha settlement. But this was far from the situation negotiators en-
countered at the outset of the round.  
 
Reciprocal market access negotiations have been victims of their own success. Nine successful 
rounds of multilateral negotiations concentrated on manufactured goods, together with considerable 
regional as well as unilateral liberalization, mean that border barriers to trade no longer loom par-
ticularly large in the calculations of industrial exporters. Non agricultural market access (NAMA) 
negotiations have run into a serious problem of “diminishing returns to liberalization”, leading of-
fensive lobbies (and policy makers) turn their attention to other, less visible mechanisms that now 
play a relatively greater role in impeding trade. 
 
This situation does not, however, extend to agriculture, which was “bracketed” in round after round 
of GATT negotiations and only formally became part of the multilateral regime with the 1994 Mar-
rakech agreements. In that sense, the acquis of the GATT regime is unbalanced. Tariffs are substan-
tially lower in manufacturing than in agricultural trade. Countries with an offensive interest in agri-
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cultural goods do not face the same kind of diminishing returns to tariff liberalization as countries 
with an offensive interest in manufacturing.  
 
This suggests that countries’ agenda priorities at the WTO will vary systematically according to 
Members’ distribution of offensive interests between agriculture and manufacturing. Members with 
an offensive interest in agriculture could be expected to prefer a narrow agenda based on reciprocal 
market access concessions, whereas Members with an offensive interest in manufacturing will seek 
to expand their win sets by advocating a broader agenda that stresses the types of regulatory issues 
that loom largest in their horizons. 
 
At the same time, negotiators face a second legacy issue: tariff overhang in manufacturing markets. 
The term refers to the gap between the multilaterally negotiated upper limits on tariffs (bound tariff 
rates) and the rates importing countries apply in practice.  This gap, which practitioners refer to 
informally as “water in the tariffs”, has grown substantial in many developing countries. A decade 
and a half of unilateral liberalization, often under pressure from the Breton Woods institutions, re-
sulted in substantial unilateral cuts in applied tariff rates, and to the growth of the gap between ap-
plied and bound rates. Tariff overhang erodes the value of all but the most drastic reciprocal market 
access concessions in the eyes of European manufacturing exporters, since only extremely aggres-
sive concessions would reach beyond the water in many developing country tariffs and provide ac-
tual improvements in applied rates. 
 
The lopsided acquis of the GATT regime, alongside tariff overhang, suggest that a multilateral ne-
gotiating agenda centered on a traditional, market access for market access quid pro quo would be 
of limited interest to European offensive interests. From their point of view, the priority will be to 
harmonize the kinds of behind-the-border regulations that have presented the greatest obstacles to 
them as they attempt to operate overseas. If we assume that Commission negotiators are concerned 
to maximize the concentrated gains accruing to those offensive interests, then we can see why the 
EU’s long championed an expansive agenda for the Doha Round.  
 
2.2. The Rise and Fall of Europe’s Multilateral Win Set (1996-2006) 
The fundamental question at the outset of the Doha Round concerned the “grand bargain” that 
would underpin a final agreement. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) issue linkages had been 
established at the multilateral level  for the first time between the traditional tariff abatement 
agenda and new issues. Rather than trading off access to the home market in return for access to 
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trade partners’ markets in the traditional way, the Uruguay Round’s “grand bargain” called for de-
veloping countries to accept disciplines in areas not previously regulated by the trade regime in re-
turn for improved access to developed countries' agricultural and textile markets. Was Doha to be a 
traditional, market access for market access agreement, or was it to be patterned on a Uruguay 
Round style grand bargain? 
 
Beginning with the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, European Negotiators made clear their 
preference for a Uruguay Round style agreement. Realizing that major players in the developing 
world saw its main defensive interests (agricultural liberalization) as the raison d'être for the new 
round, the Commission sought to preemptively expand its win set by setting an agenda that would 
allow it to set off concessions in agriculture against gains in new regulatory areas. 
 
Specifically, the Commission strove to include disciplines on the so-called "Singapore Issues" in 
the Doha agenda. These four new issues - standards for public procurement, competition policy, 
investment policy and trade facilitation - covered areas that had not previously been covered by the 
trade regime: at least, not on a multilateral basis. Alongside this emphasis on the Singapore Issues, 
the EU prioritized a new agreement for Trade in Services that, in itself, would amount to a behind-
the-border agreement on investment rules and regulatory matters (e.g., banking regulations, stana-
dards for public procurement, etc.) 
 
EU advocacy of the Singapore Issues fits in well within the behavior one might expect by extending 
Dür and de Bièvre’s model of EU trade policy making into agenda setting controversies. Establish-
ing the principle of "national treatment" in public procurement, for instance, would create concen-
trated benefits for EU offensive interests by allowing European companies to compete directly in a 
vast, worldwide market that had been regulated by plurilateral agreements only. Disciplining in-
vestment and competition rules multilaterally, implicitly along the model of the regulatory frame-
works in force in Europe, would greatly simplify and regularize operations for European-based 
multinational enterprises, effectively multilateralizing the business practices they were already fa-
miliar with. The inclusion of the Singapore Issues into the Doha Agenda would generate concen-
trated benefits for exporters analogous to those created, in previous rounds, by reciprocal tariff 
abatement. 
 
Te “grand bargain” the European Union envisioned for the Doha Round could be schematized as: 
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Figure 1: The EU’s preferred grand bargain 
 
The EU’s push to include these new issues in the Doha Agenda met bitter opposition from many of 
the WTO’s developing Members. Still smarting from the unanticipated costs of implementing new 
disciplines after the Uruguay Round, and disappointed by the meager new market access opportuni-
ties that agreement had opened up. Developing countries had assumed that, in agreeing to label 
Doha a “development round”, the developed world’s representatives had agreed to prioritize those 
issues of most interest to the developing world. The commission’s dogged determination to include 
the Singapore issues in the Doha Agenda was perceived as inconsistent with its pledge to make 
Doha “about development”, and was interpreted as fresh evidence of EU “hypocrisy.” 
 
After five years of difficult negotiations, including the two spectacularly failed Ministerials in Seat-
tle and Cancún, the EU relented on August 1st, 2004, agreeing to drop three of the four new issues 
from the Doha Agenda, and leaving only the least controversial of them - trade facilitation - up for 
new negotiations. This agenda setting agreement, normally referred to as the July Package, was 
seen as an important victory for developing countries at the time. The EU had been forced to accept 
an agenda consistent with Doha’s billing as a “development round”: one whose focus remained on 
the issues of concern to developing country members. 
 
However, from the point of view of the EU, this developing country victory reduced the negotia-
tion’s win set. It both limited the set of multilaterally viable potential agreements, (because it made 
it impossible to establish issue linkages between new issues and market access issues, as was done 
in the Uruguay Round) and, more relevantly, limited the set of domestically desirable potential 
agreements, as this more limited agenda both increased the prospect of concentrated losses to the 
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Europe’s agricultural sector, and diminished the prospects for concentrated gains for Europe’s of-
fensive interests. Not surprisingly, after July 2004, the European negotiating stance hardened.   
 
The grand bargain on offer was no longer “balanced” from the point of view of the EU’s internal 
political economy. It’s a situation we may schematize so: 
 
 
Figure 4: The Bargain without the new issues 
 
The exclusion of the new issues from the agenda forced the European negotiators to seek concen-
trated gains for its export interests elsewhere in order to re-balance the round’s “grand bargain”. 
The commission’s solution was to place increased emphasis on the non-agricultural market access 
negotiations, substantially hardening its demand from developing countries by insisting that NAMA 
concessions eliminate tariff overhang in key industry, resulting in cuts to applied, and not just 
bound, tariffs.  
 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial conference in December 2005, EU negotiators demanded that non-
agricultural tariffs be reduced via the Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15. The proposal would 
effectively cap bound tariffs for manufactured goods at 15% on an ad valorem basis, while slashing 
all existing tariff bindings in manufacturing. The commission argued that only such drastic meas-
ures would effectively eliminate the tariff overhang and provide actual improvements in market ac-
cess to its exporters. In effect, once the new issues were excluded from the agenda, NAMA loomed 
much larger in the EU’s vision of a Doha Round grand bargain: 
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Figure 5: A balanced agreement with expanded NAMA ambitions 
 
Demands for tariff cuts on the scale implied by a Swiss 15 settlement, however, were unacceptable 
to leading G20 countries. Coupled with the EU’s defensive stance on cuts to agricultural tariffs, its 
demand for aggressive industrial liberalization deepened the perception of policy inconsistency that 
underpinned developing countries’ view of a “hypocritical” EU stance. Ironically, having made the 
key concessions to resolve the perception of agenda inconsistency, the commission was forced into 
a position that strengthened perceptions of policy inconsistency. 
 
2.3. Describing the Doha Triangle 
How can we describe the complex set off issues that have prevented the Doha Round from reaching 
agreement since setting a formal agenda in 2004? At the center of the difficulties has been a three-
way deadlock between the three main negotiating blocs on the three most contentious topics up for 
negotiation - a fundamental impasse the negotiators themselves have come to refer to as "the trian-
gle" (WTO News, 2006.) The three players are the European Union, the United States, and the G20 
group of relatively advanced developing countries - which includes Brazil, India, South Africa, 
Thailand, Argentina and China. The three topics are industrial liberalization and two aspects of ag-
ricultural liberalization: tariffs and subsidies. 
 
Each of the three players has an offensive interests in two of the three agenda items and a defensive 
interest in the third. The rub, of course, is that each partner's defensive priority also constitutes the 
other two players' offensive priority.  The triangle can be schematized thus: 
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Figure 1: The Triangle 
 
Each issue pits two of the blocks against the third, in a round-robin pattern. The EU's first negotiat-
ing priority has been to avoid major cuts in agricultural tariffs, the main mechanism for protecting 
its dominant defensive lobby. Though European farmers also benefit from substantial subsidies, the 
EU's Common Agricultural Policy has been extensively reformed in the last decade to ensure those 
subsidies are compatible with WTO rules (Swinbanka and Daugbjergb 2006). Having brought its 
domestic support regime into line with multilateral disciplines, the commission now wants to see 
the US pursue a similar path. At the same time, much European industry is export oriented and, due 
to outsourcing trends, relies on internationally disagregated value chains, so the EU's foremost of-
fensive priority has been to secure multilateral liberalization for manufactured goods. 
 
The United States, by contrast, has negotiated defensively on agricultural subsidies, and offensively 
on agricultural and industrial tariffs. Politically influential US agricultural producers receive gener-
ous subsidies that have not been reformed to conform with WTO rules, so the US Trade Represen-
tative's major red-lines during the Doha Round have concerned avoiding deep cuts in those subsi-
dies. Although a handful of US crops also benefits from considerable tariff protection, US farm tar-
iffs are typically not as high as Europe's. US agriculture operates on a larger scale than its European 
counterpart, with higher capital:labor ratios and productivity. US farmers therefore do not perceive 
multilateral tariff abatement to be as risky to their underlying interests as European farmers do. In 
parallel, US industry is as export oriented and dependent on cross border value chains as its Euro-
pean counterpart, so tariff cuts in manufacturing markets was an offensive priority for the USTR. 
 
Generalizing about a group as heterogeneous as the G20 group of relatively advanced developing 
countries is, admittedly, a fraught exercise. However, in general terms, a number of G20 countries 
provide few agricultural subsidies and, in some cases, world leading agricultural export sectors 
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based on strong comparative advantages in agriculture. Their negotiators have therefore pushed to 
secure drastically improved access to the agricultural sectors of the developed countries. Though 
the G20 is officially an agriculture-only club, and therefore doesn't have a single position on non 
agricultural issues such as industrial tariffs, some influential G20 industrial sectors - particularly in 
Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and India - are not internationally competitive and stand to bear 
concentrated losses should an aggressive NAMA deal be struck. Key G20 countries have therefore 
negotiated defensively on industrial tariffs. The major exception, of course, has been China.  
 
The overall pattern of alliance making on these three issues, then, would look like this: 
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Figure 2: Triangle Dynamics 
 
“The triangle” has become a familiar point of reference for Doha Round practitioners, a sort of ne-
gotiator’s shorthand to designate the central deadlock in the talks. From a theoretical point of view, 
what’s particularly interesting is that the deadlock it describes is based entirely on the internal in-
consistency of the negotiating position of each of the main trade blocs, on their simultaneous liber-
alism and protectionism (in different sectors).  
 
It bears noting that the persistence of the Doha Impasse is at odds with the predictions of the ortho-
dox account of the political economy of trade policy making. While the conflict between exporters’ 
and import competitors’ interests is clear, the salient fact is that negotiators have not responded to 
heterogeneous pressures by harmonizing heterogeneous interests into a coherent policy stance, as 
theory predicts. Offensive interests have not “outlobbied” defensive interests in any of the three 
main triangle trade partners; they have not forced negotiators to side with them and against the in-
terests of import competitors by adopting a consistently liberal position. Rather, and even in the 
face of lasting deadlock, negotiators have retained their inconsistent positions, and sought more 
promising venues in which to advance them. 
 
The triangle therefore bolsters De Bièvre and Dür’s behavioral assumptions about trade policy 
makers’ decision making. On both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in the global south, negotiators 
seek to secure concentrated benefits for their offensive interests and to avoid imposing concentrated 
costs on their defensive lobbies.  
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2.4.The turn to the new regionalism 
Up until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, developed countries found the grand bargain that 
implicitly underpinned multilateral liberalization attractive enough to reach agreement. But in the 
current round, the implicit quid-pro-quo envisaged by the main powers caused an unprecedented 
level of controversy and was eventually rejected in the 2004 July Package. We have argued that 
agenda choices pre-configure the range of potential agreements in a round. Our contention is that 
the Doha Round has deadlocked because the agenda choices made in the summer of 2004 leave the 
European Union without a win set.  
 
 
Figure X: The disappearance of the commission’s winset 
 
By dashing the prospect of new multilateral disciplines on competition, investment and government 
procurement, the eventual agenda compromise shrunk the set of desirable potential agreements 
from the European Commission’s point of view, by eliminating the field of negotiations most likely 
to produce concentrated gains for Europe’s offensive interests. It also limited the possibility of es-
tablishing issue linkages between agricultural liberalization and new issues, shrinking the set of vi-
able agreements by ruling out the kinds of issue linkages that had allowed Uruguay Round negotia-
tors to trade concessions on Intellectual Property Rights, for instance, for concessions on tariff cuts 
for textiles. The result was the closing of the European Union’s win set in the Doha Round.  
 
Of course, its failure in agenda setting did not diminish the commission’s underlying interest in ex-
porting its regulatory standards on competition, investment and government procurement. When an 
agenda settlement forecloses the possibility of agreement in one negotiating forum, an office seek-
ing policy maker will search for a different venue to achieve the same goals. And this, indeed, is 
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what the commission has done. In October 2006, the commission ended its self-imposed, seven year 
moratorium on launching new regional and bilateral talks, heralding a shift in its preferred negotiat-
ing venue. In an influential strategy paper, DG Trade pledged to deepen Europe’s system of “spa-
ghetti bowl agreements”, stressing the need for a “new generation of Free Trade Agreements” and 
pledging to prioritize negotiations with partners with large potential markets for EU exporters such 
as ASEAN, the Gulf Co-operation Council and South Korea. The new strategy explicitly notes that, 
“future FTAs should also include new provisions for investment, IPR, public procurement and 
competition.” (European Commission, 2006.) Elsig (2006:942) describes this shift as an autono-
mous strategic decision on the part of the commission in response to mounting frustration over the 
lack of progress around the multilateral table.   
 
The conclusion that this “turn towards the new regionalism” constitutes the commission’s perceived 
“best alternative to a multilaterally negotiated agreement” stems from an examination of its position 
in the early, agenda-setting part of the Doha Round. As Young (2007) frames it, during agenda set-
ting talks the commission systematically favours agreements that do not require it to undergo inter-
nal regulatory change, in other words, deals that tend to “scale up” the EU acquis. Such agreements: 
 • Require little or no further agricultural liberalization or reform to the CAP 
 • Markedly improve European firms’ access to foreign industrial and service markets 
 • “Export” the EU’s regulatory framework, by strengthening norms on intellectual prop-
erty, tightening norms on investment, government procurement, competition, etc. As we have seen, 
the foreclosed the possibility of adopting such a blueprint at the multilateral level.  
 
If the choice facing the commission had been “multilateral agreement or no agreement,” the com-
mission may have agreed to aggregate heterogeneous interests, accepting a more consistent negoti-
ating stance even at the cost of imposing concentrated costs on import competitors, all for the sake 
of reaching agreement. But, in the era of the New Regionalism, this was not the choice facing the 
commission. The depth of its commitment to the multilateral process depends on its judgment about 
the relative likelihood of realizing its priorities at the multilateral or at the regional or bilateral lev-
els. In the terminology of negotiations theory, from the commission’s perspective the best alterna-
tive to a multilaterally negotiated agreement was not no-agreement-at-all; it was a set of bilateral, 
regional or interregionally negotiated agreements. 
 
This turn to the new regionalism was enabled by a series of factors. First, commission negotiators 
have substantial experience in regional and bilateral negotiations. The EU itself, lest we forget, was 
Francisco P. Toro          Working Paper  - Agenda Disputes and Strategic Venue Preferences 26 
 
itself originally a Customs Union, and the EU has developed an extensive web of bilateral and re-
gional trade pacts, ranging from the Euromed Agreements with Mediterranean basin states to the 
growing number of Economic Partnership agreements with former European colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific under the Cotonou Agreement. Alongside these are trade agreements 
with such far-flung trade partners as South Africa, Chile and Kazakhstan. Moreover, negotiations 
towards bilateral and regional agreements were ongoing with Mexico, the Mercosur and the Andean 
Community.  
 
The attractions of such “spaghetti bowl” agreements are plain. By negotiating asymmetrically with 
weaker trade partners, the EU prevents the aggregation of developing countries' bargaining power 
through broad-based coalitions such as the G20, which managed to block adoption of an expansive 
regulatory agenda at the Doha Round. As a result, the commission exercises far more leverage over 
agenda-setting in regional and bilateral settings than at the multilateral level. The asymmetric value 
of market access concessions in bilateral negotiations between the EU and small developing coun-
tries greatly expands the commission’s win set. The three dropped Singapore Issues feature promi-
nently in all of the EU’s bilateral and regional negotiations, as well as issues the commission never 
even tried to place on the multilateral agenda, (e.g. cooperation in the fight against money launder-
ing and drug trafficking). The potential to trade off access to its market for concessions on such dis-
parate issues would simply not exist in a WTO setting. So, as a strategy, venue switching preserves 
the viability of an inconsistent policy stance, forestalling the need for the commission to undertake 
the politically problematic task of siding with offensive interests and against defensive ones. 
 
In short, our argument is that, throughout the Doha Round European policy makers have acted stra-
tegically to preserve the viability of an inconsistent negotiating stance. In agenda setting negotia-
tions, commission negotiators sought the agenda most likely to allow them to continue to champion 
the interests both of its defensive and of its offensive lobby. When it failed to secure its desired 
agenda at the multilateral level, the commission responded not by abandoning trade diplomacy (no-
agreement) but by venue switching: redirecting negotiating resources regional and bilateral negotia-
tions it judged more likely to yield agreements that confer concentrated benefits on their offensive 
interests and limit the concentrated costs accruing to its defensive interests. 
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